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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent in Case No. 11174 concurs with 
both the State of Utah and Salt Lake City as to the na-
ture of the case. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Likewise, this Plaintiff-Respondent concurs with the 
statements of the other parties concerning the disposition 
in the lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Thi,s Plaintiff-Respondent seeks the same relief as 
that sought in the companion case by the appeal of the 
State of Utah and to have reversed the decision of the 
trial Judge as it pertains to upholding the validity of the 
ordinance in Case No. 11174. At the same time, this Plain-
tiff-Re·spondent seeks to have upheld those portions of 
the deci.,sion of the trial Judge in Case No. 1117 4 which 
deny entry to private clubs by peace officers except 
through the process of lawful search warrants. 
To the end that thi·s Plaintiff-Respondent seeks the 
same relief in the Supreme Oourt as does the State of 
Utah, this Plaintiff-Respondent ooncurs with the points 
raised by the State of Utah in its brief without reiter-
ating those points or argument herein, except as may be 
·supplemented by the points hereinafter raised. 
iSTATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Plaintiff-Respondent concurs with both the 
State of Utah and Salt Lake City as to the statements of 
fact in their respective briefs. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TO SUSrrAIN THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION \YOULD BE TO 
SUPPORT "LEFT-HANDED PROHIBITION" IN 
CONTRAVENTION OF STATE LAW. 
Salt Lake City would appear, in Point V of its brief, 
to argue that it can enact an ordinance "regulating" 
private clubs that is just as tough as its Commission may 
choose when it infers that such clubs must be willing to 
accept the conditions (query: any conditions, even if they 
are confiscatory~) that are imposed upon them. 
Counsel for Salt Lake City exposed that position 
even more fluently before the trial Court. In effect, coun-
sel stated that Salt Lake City can make the rules as strict 
as it wants for private clubs and if these State-fran-
chised clubs don't like Salt Lake City's rules they can 
move out to some other political subdivision. 
This Plaintiff-Respondent submits that such is not 
the law. 
In 1960, Salt Lake County attempted to tell the State 
Liquor Control ~mmission where it could and could not 
establish retail liquor stores and agencies. Not so, said 
this Court (Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control Commis-
sion, 11 Utah 2d 235, 357 P.2d 488). 
This Court pronounced, at page 490: "If an ordi-
nance ipso facto could render impotent the enactment 
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giving the Liquor Contrnl Commission this authority (to 
locate liquor stores and package agencies), unincorpor-
ated areas in counties could enjoy a sort of local option 
ais to liquor sales and consumption that neighboring ones 
would not enjoy, and a sort of left-handed Prohibition 
created by a process of exclusion by ordinance,-a result, 
we are satisfied, which was not intended by the Liquor 
Control Act.'' 
How relatively simple to paraphrase this pronounce-
ment ·of thi1s Court to fit the instant cases: "If an ordi-
nance ipso facto could render impotent the enactment 
giving the Secretary of State this authority (to franchise 
and regulate private clubs wherein intoxicating liquor is 
permitted to be stored and served), Salt Lake City could 
enjoy a sort of local option as to liquor storage and con-
sumption that neighboring ones would not enjoy, and a 
sort of left-handed Prohibition created by a proces.s of 
exclusion by ordinance,-a result, we are satisfied, which 
was not intended by the Liquor-Locker Club Act.'' 
In enacting 11-10-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953, the 
Legislature very advisedly chose the mandatory expres-
sion "shall license" rather than the permissive "may 
license" and excluded any authority to regulate in order 
that they prev·ent any of this "left-handed Prohibition" 
which this Court akeady has found offensive. 
This Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the import 
sought by Salt Lake City to be given to 11-10-1 Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 would require a recognition by this Court 
that "left-handed Prohibition" is not as offensive as it 
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was found in the !Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control 
Oommission case, supra. 
POINT II 
THE ORDINANCE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS 
GUARANTEED BY BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS THAT PEOPLE SHALL BE SAFE 
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZ-
URES. 
Section 7 of the Ordinance provides, in part: '' ... if 
entrance to the premise·s or facilities of the club is only 
by use of a key or other device then a key or such device 
must be supplied to the chief of police, ... ". 
Section 14 provides, in part: "All peace officel"s are 
given the express right to confiscate without the prior 
issuance of a writ or warrant ... , any liquor ... which 
(are) stored on the premises of club that is not properly 
labeled as to ownership or stored in a member's locker 
and to which no one claims title." 
Section 20 provides : ''Any peace officer shall have 
the right to enter the club room, meeting rooms, premises 
and facilities of non-profit clubs for the purpose of de-
termining whether any laws or ordinances are being vio-
lated therein and in the case of clubs holding Class "B" 
or Class '' C '' licenses, the police department shall make 
periodic inspections of said premises and report its find-
ings to the Board of Commissioners.'' 
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Section 23 provides, in part: ''Licenses may be sus-
pended 1or revoked by the Board of Comrnis·sioners for 
the violation of any provision of this title or any other 
applicable ordinance or law relating to alcoholic bev-
erages .... ". 
Thus, reading these provisions together any peace 
offioer (he doesn't have to be a Salt Lake City police-
man) could enter the premises of any club in Salt Lake 
City, either with the key provided the chief of police or 
otherwise, could confiscate liquor, gather other evidence 
and report it back to the board of commissioners who, in 
turn, could revoke the club's license without a hearing. 
All ·of thi,s, Salt Lake City would have us believe, could 
be done without any warrant of any sort. 
By what authority, either divine or otherv,-ise, does 
Salt Lake City claim this right 7 According to its brief, 
Point V, because Salt Lake City is granting free citizens 
the "privilege" of organizing a social club and maintain-
ing rooms for that social club, those free citizens must 
sacrifice the constitutional rights against such an un-
reaisonable S<earch and seizure. Neither Amendment IV to 
the U. S. Constitution nor Constitution of Utah, Art. I, 
Sec. 14, will permit such an absurdity. 
Of ,specific importance in this regard is the total lack 
of any substantive law in the argument of Salt Lake City 
in Point V of its brief. How does it get around the pro-
nouncements of the United States Supreme Court 
(Camara v. Mwnicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. _172'1, 
18 L.Ed . .2d 930) "? Merely by ignoring them. 
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'l'he Camara case, supra, involved attempted inspec-
ti1ous for enforcement of San Francisco's housing codes. 
Those city codes permitted just such inspections. Failure 
to permit inspections was made an offense. 
The U.S. Supreme Court continued to embrace the 
Lasic philosophy of search warrants only recently re-
embraced by this Oourt (State v. Jasso, 439 P2d 844, no 
Utah citation) that if the right to privacy must yield to 
the right of search it is a matter to be decided by a judi-
cial officer (upon application for a warrant), and not by 
a policeman or a government enforcement agent. The 
Court further held that administrative searches of the 
kind sought in that case were significant intrusions upon 
interests protected by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. 
Cons ti tu ti on. 
The i,ssue in the Camara case, supra, wa>S whether the 
defendant was occupying a portion of the premises as a 
residence when the permit was solely for commercial 
occupation. The Court would not require inspection with-
out a warrant, disregarding any question as to whether 
or not it was a commercial building or a dwelling. 
In this regard, the nature of private social clubs in 
Utah becomes important. Such a club is a non-profit 
association of various citizens who have some common 
interest. In some instances that common interest may be 
no more than a desire to have a place in which members 
may entertain customers, clients, friends, etc. without re-
sort to permitting consumption of intoxicating liquor 
within their own homes. Perhaps Salt Lake City finds it 
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inconceivable that some of its citizens might like to 
"drink" or to entertain without doing it at home where 
their minor children may be exposed to the evils of the 
presence of "demon rum". 
Nonetheless, those are the brutal facts and many if 
not all such club members look upon ''their club'' as an 
extension of their living room, family r'oom, recreatioH 
room, etc. 
This Court took a similar view in State v. Alta Club, 
et al., 120 Utah 121, 232 P.:2d 759, when it upheld the right 
of members to so ally themselves socially even without 
permissive legislation. 
The trial Judge in Case No. 11174 took an even more 
stern view. On page three of his ''Memorandum Deci-
sion'', the Court said: ''I hold that the clubrooms of the 
plaintiffs fall into the same category as private dwelling 
houses.'' 
Indeed they are! To the members who use them as 
an extension to their living room, etc., indeed they are! 
As such, this Plaintiff-Respondent submits, they are 
entitled to be kept free fr.om the unreasonable searches ' 
and seizures by "any peace officer" as contemplated by 
the Ordinance. Otherwise, what next in Salt Lake City? 
An ordinance that its free citizens must permit the same 
type of unwarranted searches and seizures of their homes , 
in exchange for the "privilege" of living in Salt Lake 
City? 
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Under the philosophy espoused by Counsel for Salt 
Lake City, thi,s is not far-fetched. 
CONCLUSION 
This Plaintiff-Respondent submits that the rights of 
the people of Salt Lake City to be safe from unreasonable 
searches and seizures ,should be jealously guarded by this 
Court by expressly striking down the provisions Qf 1See-
tions 7, 14 and 20 of the Ordinance; and, further, that the 
entire Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional for 
the various reasons set forth her·ein and in the brief on 
file herein on behalf of the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLLIE MeCULLOCH 
510 American Oil Bldg. 
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